Abstract: Over the past decade declining fertility in Australia has been the subject of much debate among academics, policy analysts and in media commentary. Initially, explanations for the decline focused on structural causes such as improved fertility control, economic globalisation, changes in the labour market, changing gender roles and falling state support for families and children. More recently, social researchers and analysts have proposed that individual preferences may be changing, with younger age cohorts putting career advancement and higher standards of living ahead of family formation. Using data from the Negotiating the Lifecourse (NLC) project, this paper examines the extent to which differing attitudes and aspirations are associated with fertility intentions. The study finds that arguments advanced about younger generations becoming 'more selfish' and placing higher priorities on material and personal advancement than investing in a family are not typical of the majority of those who said they did not want a child. The analysis also points out that there is a significant gap between fertility intentions observed in cross-section and actual outcomes observed longitudinally.
decline in fertility fall into two broad groups: wider systemic changes and the changed lifecourse choices and aspirations of young adults. As de Vaus (2002:21) suggests, it is in the interplay between these two sets of factors that reasonably robust causal explanations of declining fertility are most likely to be found: … as well as understanding the structural, demographic and social context in which fertility occurs, there is a need to understand the decisions individuals make about having children . … A better understanding of fertility decision making must add this subjective dimension in order to gain a fuller grasp of the factors behind declining fertility rates. This paper is in part a response to the issues that de Vaus raises. The study is based on the longitudinal data collected by the Negotiating the Life Course project and concentrates on the views and circumstances of those respondents who have never had a child and their fertility intentions (http://lifecourse.anu.edu.au). The part of the study reported here is an examination of the responses of this 'childless' group to a range of questions regarding the role and impact of children, gender roles, career and lifestyle aspirations. Future papers will follow the respondents through subsequent waves of data collection to observe the extent to which fertility intentions are realised, how long they take to be realised, and whether or not respondent's attitudes and aspirations remain constant over time.
Competing explanatory frameworks
Over the past few years several surveys of the literature on falling fertility rates and the decline in family formation have been published, notably those by Parker (2002), de Vaus (2002) and Kinnear (2003) . Each of these surveys has distinguished two broad schools of thought about the causes of fertility decline. First, systemic level explanations that stress factors such as improved fertility control, economic globalisation, changes in the labour market, changing gender roles and falling state support for families and children. Second, explanations that stress changes in attitudes and aspirations at the individual level as captured by the notions of individualisation, risk and the social values of late modernity, exemplified by the work of Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) .
Although referring to the larger question of the changing nature of "the family", Pamela Kinnear's (2003:21) observation that these competing explanations are 'a manifestation of the classic debate within the social sciences of structure versus agency' is equally applicable to the debate over fertility rates. In other words, the main schools of thought in the fertility debate line up with explanations that declines in fertility are a consequence of wider social change, as opposed to explanations that it is the aggregation of decisions of individuals which brings about the observed changes. Most participants in this debate opt for arguments that combine a measure of both structure and agency explanations. For example, while Peter McDonald (2001) argues that 'the present structure of family benefits in Australia provides incentives for young women to reduce the number of children that they have' -a structural argument -he also notes that in 'making a decision to have a child, parents, especially mothers, are making a fundamental decision about their future' -essentially, an argument about individual agency. McDonald points out that economic and non-economic (psychosocial) costs of having children can be difficult to decipher, and that negative "unknowns" may encourage individuals to err on the side of caution.
Changing values attached to children and parenting may also add to the costs of having children. In King's opinion, Australian society has become increasingly intolerant of children and parents tend to be disparaged.
Changing life course patterns and childlessness lead to greater tolerance and eventually become "norms", shaping the expectations and preferences of those entering adulthood.
Approach and data analysis
Our starting point is to examine some of the attitudes and aspirations that the literature has identified as being associated with changing fertility -for example, the changing roles of women, perceptions of greater risk of unemployment and changing lifestyle/lifecourse expectations. In examining these factors, we stress that we can only look for associations between responses to questions of this nature and fertility intentions/behaviour. We are cautious in assigning any explanatory power to particular questions, although the cumulative differences between those who do [don't] want children across a number of questions, may indicate that different lifecourse aspirations may be evolving among younger cohorts. Even where some strong associations might be identified with different fertility intentions, it is also important to recognise that intentions may not always be manifested in actual behaviour. Variations between early fertility intentions and later outcomes may result from any number of factors, including: changed values and attitudes, changed personal circumstances (partnering, separation, employment status), and changes in reproductive capacity. One way of dealing with some of these problems is to conduct longitudinal work using data that captures intentions, attitudes, aspirations as well as being able to observe the changing circumstances of the respondent. The group 'Want a child in the future' contains those respondents who replied 'very likely, or, likely' to the question 'How likely are you to have a child in the future?'. The group 'Do not want a child in the future' includes those respondents who replied that they were 'not sure, unlikely, most unlikely and definitely not' to the same question. ** Significant difference between groups at the P<0.001 level.
Around one-third of the first NLC panel had not had a child at the time of interview, and their reported fertility intentions are shown in Table 1 . The analysis indicates that there were no significant differences between the intentions of men and women, or that educational attainment levels were significantly associated with fertility intentions. The main difference between the two groups relates to their partnered status, with those not currently in a relationship being significantly more likely to say that they did not want a child in the future. This finding is consistent with other studies (Qu et al 2000; Weston and Qu 2001) . The two groups shown in Table 1 form the basis for the results reported below which aggregates individual behavioural explanations for declining fertility put forward in the literature into three broad sets of arguments. These are: heightened perceptions of risk and the desire for employment and material security; greater emphasis on personal goals and lifestyle expectations versus satisfaction from family and children;
and changing roles and aspirations of women. Twenty-five questions from the NLC survey that reflect aspects of each of these areas were selected for analysis, with the most significant findings reported here.
Employment/material security
A number of writers have stressed that changes in the labour market and the broader economy may have eroded the confidence of younger people to commit to a partner, enter home ownership and have children (Kohler et al 2001; McDonald 2000; Lewis and Brannen 2000) . For women, the additional risk of becoming a sole parent may also be an important factor in forming their early fertility intentions. In terms of labour market issues, Table 2 indicates that having a secure job, with opportunities for advancement are far more important to those who want to have a child in the future. Other employment characteristics such as level of earnings and flexible working hours were seen as equally important by both groups. In terms of aspirations for the future, these two groups differed significantly in their desire to attain home ownership and seeking career advancement. In Table 3a those who would like to have a child place greater importance on career advancement than those who do not want a child. Table 3b indicates that for those who do want to have a child, less importance is attached to home ownership aspirations than on career advancement. The significant difference between the two groups here is the much higher level of home ownership already attained by those who don't want a child. There were no significant differences between these groups when asked about the importance of achieving a secure financial position. 2.2 Personal growth and the status of parenthood Weston and Parker (2002) report research that suggests that younger cohorts have 'become increasingly concerned about achieving self-realisation, autonomy and freedom from the bonds of traditional forces, including religion, and that these values are incompatible with parenting'. These changes might translate into both less desire for having children and being less willing to support government expenditures that are directed towards other people's children. The latter possibly leading to a lowering of the social status of parenthood. Asked whether children were a 'burden' Table 4a shows that those who do not want to have a child were more likely to agree with this statement than those who do, although we note that the cell sizes are small here. Similarly, Table 4b suggests that those who do not want to have children were far less likely to agree with the statement that people should consider the needs of their spouse and children as more important than their own. Interestingly, there were no appreciable differences in the responses of these two groups to questions about whether children have too great an impact on the freedom of their mother/father. A number of writers ask whether changing life course patterns, leading to smaller families and the increasing incidence of childless families, might lead to differing preferences -with children seen as a choice, 'rather than an inevitable pathway in life' (Weston and Parker 2002) . So, how do these two groups feel about the part children play in the life course? Tables 5a and b, indicate that those who do not want children are far less likely to view children as a necessary element of a fulfilling life. 
Women's changing social and economic aspirations
Women's changing educational attainment and greater labour force participation have been argued to play a major role in fertility choices (Weston and Parker 2002; Kinnear 2002; OECD 2002) . One major expression of these changes during the 1980s and 1990s in Australia, was the re-direction of social expenditure away from direct cash transfer support for those caring for children at home, towards greater subsidisation or direct fee support for childcare provided outside the home (Mitchell 1997) . On childcare issues, there were no major differences between these groups, with both agreeing that: childcare should be shared equally between two working partners; and that, there should be satisfactory childcare facilities so that women can take jobs outside the home. Where there is a striking difference in attitudes between these groups is the primary role for women of motherhood versus career. As Table 6 reports, those who do not want a child are more likely to disagree with views that motherhood is more important than working. 
Conclusions
As a first glance at the role changing individual attitudes and aspirations might be playing in declining fertility rates, the analyses presented here suggest that there may not be any marked differences between those who do and do not want children. Of the twenty-five attitudinal questions examined from the NLC data, only ten elicited significantly different responses between the two groups. Tentatively, the results reported above suggest that those who do not want children are less inclined to view motherhood as being more important than women having a career (Table 6a ) and children being an essential element of a fulfilling life (Tables 5a and b) .
The NLC data suggest that the arguments advanced about younger generations becoming 'more selfish' and placing higher priorities on material and personal advancement than investing in a family are not typical of the majority of those who have not yet had a child.
Those who do want to have children, do attach more emphasis to job security, career advancement and home ownership and so the concerns expressed by some analysts about the economic and policy environment find some support in the NLC data.
While the above analyses show that there were some significant differences between these two groups at the Wave 1 interviews, the extent to which these intentions are realised is the key concern. To give a preliminary indication of fertility outcomes, Table 7 compares the stated fertility intentions in Wave 1 with intentions/outcomes in Wave 2.
The table shows that intentions can shift quite dramatically in a relatively short space of time. While 90% of those who said they did not want a child in 1997, had still not had a child by 2000, far fewer (30%) thought that "no children" was the ideal number of children. Of those who said they would like a child in Wave 1, 20% had achieved this by Wave 2 with a further 70% of this group reporting that they would like to have two or more children. A small number (~5%) of those who said they wanted a child in Wave 1 now see "no children" as the ideal number of children to have. 
